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Abstract
We study the trends and fluctuations in greenfield foreign direct investment
(GFDI) during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis on a global scale.
We analyse the data of a data set of GFDI provided by fDi Markets (Financial
Times) to understand the contraction of GFDI during the first three quarters of
the year 2020, taking into account the sector of the investment and the host and
home country.We analyse both the long-run trends and the quarter-over-quarter
changes in GFDI to capture its fluctuations before and during the first wave of
the COVID-19 crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis. Our findings cast light
on which countries’ and industries’ GFDIs were most affected by the pandemic
crisis and draw a comparison to the global financial crisis. To our surprise, many
services industries have shown unexpected resilience of GFDI due to the flexibility for remote work. On the contrary, GFDI in the manufacturing industries,
as well as the extractives and the utility industries, has shown a dramatic decline
during the pandemic.These contractions raise questions of stability and resilience
of the global supply chains these industries are a part of.

Brooklyn College, Koppelman School of Business, City University of New York, Brooklyn, NY, USA.
Graduate Center, Program in Economics, City University of New York, Brooklyn, NY, USA.
3
School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, Philippines.
4
The World Bank, Washington D.C., USA.
5
Department of Economics, Christ (Deemed to be University), BGR Campus, Bangalore, India.
6
Department of Management, Strategy and Innovation, Faculty of Economics and Business, KU
Leuven, Belgium.
1
2

Corresponding author:
Nadia Doytch, Department of Economics, Koppelman School of Business, Brooklyn College, City
University of New York, 217 Whitehead Hall, 2900 Bedford Avenue, Brooklyn, NY 11210, USA.
E-mail: ndoytch@brooklyn.cuny.edu

Doytch et al.

455

JEL Codes: F21
Keywords
Greenfield foreign direct investment (GFDI), foreign direct investment (FDI),
COVID-19 crisis, global financial crisis, GFDI industries, GFDI countries

Introduction
Economic historians distinguish two ‘waves of globalization’ in the past two
centuries: the late nineteenth century to the First World War and a resurgence in
global economic integration after the Second World War, which continues to the
present. The waves of globalisation are characterised by surges in international
trade, foreign investment, as well as a certain degree of business cycle synchronisation. The factors attributed to the rise of globalisation include international
political stability, infrastructure development and falling costs of transport and
communication. However, this greater interconnectedness of the world also means
greater interdependence, which can lead to disruptions in times of crisis. A recent
disruption in international trade and investment preceding the COVID-19 crisis was
the 2008 global financial crisis. From the current perspective, the global financial
crisis may turn out to be a short-lived disruption in comparison to the slowdown
in international (and domestic) activity caused by the COVID-19 crisis. Today, the
world is even more interconnected through global production value chains, international trade in parts and components, travel and tourism, as well as Internet and
telecommunication technologies, which are the basis of new services industries.
The beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis caused a dramatic economic
shock that rippled across all economic sectors and geographical regions throughout
the year 2020. At the very beginning of the crisis, the global foreign direct investment
(FDI) flows were forecast to suffer a drastic decline, up to 40% in 2020 from their
2019 level of US$1.54 trillion (UNCTAD, 2020). Such a decline, the World
Investment Report (WIR) (2020) argues, would bring FDI below the US$1 trillion
mark for the first time since 2005 and will bring FDI further down in 2021 and 2022
(UNCTAD, 2020). Both GFDI and cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As)
dropped by more than 50% year over year in the starting months of 2020 (UNCTAD,
2020). Further, based on FDI information sourced from United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Global Investment Trends Monitor, the first
6 months of the pandemic witnessed a 37% fall in global greenfield project
announcements and a 15% fall in cross-border M&As. Further, the FDI index of the
fDI markets database stood at 703 points in October 2020, 34.4% lower compared
to October 2019 capturing the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on the sentiments
of foreign investors. In addition to the impact of COVID-19 on FDI, the pandemic
also affected other aspects of trade and the global economy. The imposed lockdowns and social distancing measures affected the tourism and travel industry
adversely. There was also a worldwide production shock. The policy response to the
pandemic varied widely across countries. With massive supply chain disruptions,
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many economies closed their borders to exports as an unprecedented measure of
national supplies preservation (UNCTAD, 2020).
The purpose of our analysis is to identify the trends in greenfield foreign direct
investment (GFDI), taking into account the sector of the investment, the recipient
country, as well as the level of the source country, using the dataset fDi Markets
source from Financial Times. Our goal is to evaluate the behaviour of GFDI
during the first wave of the pandemic (the first three quarters of 2020). Rather
than being an empirical study, this study attempts to evaluate the trends and
fluctuations of GFDI prior to and during the pandemic’s first wave and to make a
comparison with the 2008 global financial crisis, which also affected the entire
world adversely. We attempt to cast light on which countries’ and industries’
GFDIs were most affected by the pandemic crisis and draw a comparison to the
global financial crisis. Our results show that many services industries have shown
unexpected resilience of their GFDI. It is proposed that this might be due to their
flexibility for remote work. On the contrary, GFDI in the manufacturing industries
and the extractives and the utility industries has shown a dramatic decline during
the pandemic. Since these industries are a part of global value chains (GVCs), the
significant contraction of GFDI raises questions regarding the stability and
resilience of these GVCs. The global vulnerabilities of GVCs and international
trade, as well as the heavy dependence of countries on their GVC participation,
have ultimately resonated in a contraction of GFDI as well.
The rest of the article is organised as follows: in the second section, we review
the literature related to the COVID-19 economic crisis; in the third section, we
examine the long-run trends of GFDI worldwide; in the fourth section, we identify
the fluctuations in GFDI by main sectors and make a comparison between the
behaviour of GFDI during the first wave of the pandemic and during the 2008
global financial crisis; the fifth section concludes the study.

The COVID-19 Pandemic as an Economic Shock
The literature on responsiveness of FDI to business cycles is fairly recent (Araujo
et al., 2017; Broner et al., 2013; Doytch, 2015, 2021a; Lane, 2015). Araujo
et al. (2017) demonstrate that capital inflows to low-income developing countries
are procyclical but less than their developed countries’ counterparts. Broner
et al. (2013) uncover a similar procyclicality finding regarding aggregate gross
capital inflows and outflows. Doytch (2015, 2021a) uncovers counter-cyclicality
of FDI flowing into services industries, and Lane (2015) emphasises the country’s
characteristics in explaining cross-country variation in international net FDI
flow cyclicality. The responsiveness of FDI to shocks or prolonged periods
of recession, such as the current pandemic crisis, has not been well examined
with the exception of a few studies that look at natural disaster shocks (Doytch,
2020) and economic accelerations and decelerations (Doytch, 2021b). Arguably,
the COVID-19 pandemic crisis is shaping up as one of the most prolonged
and severe global economic crises in recent history (Canh & Thanh, 2020).
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The UNCTAD-Investment Trend Monitor Report (March 2020) highlights that
the adverse effect of COVID-19 would channel through market-, resource- and
efficiency-seeking FDIs. Moreover, the most affected economies and sectors are
the ones with heavy involvement in GVCs. China and several other Asian
economies were the first to witness the negative effects; for instance, in February
of 2020, Toyota reported a 70% fall in sales in China (UNCTAD-Investment
Trend Monitor Report, 2020). Besides these three channels, there was an indirect
channel through which COVID-19 had further deterred FDIs. Given the demand
shock, the earnings by foreign-affiliated firms were limited, and as a result, the
level of capital generated through sales was reduced, which subsequently affected
reinvestment. According to UNCTAD (2020), reinvested earning makes almost
40% of FDI inflows in developing countries and 61% in developed economies.
The above-mentioned withdrawal statistics highlight the severity of the pandemic
on global investment.
The experiences during the COVID-19 crisis echo the experiences during the
global financial crisis. Prior to the financial crisis, the overall FDI, especially the
GFDI announcements increased rapidly. These flows halted with the onset of
the financial crisis which plummeted its average annual growth rate to 0.4%
between 2008 and 2019 compared to 4.9% between 2000 and 2007 (WIR, 2020).
After their steady phase of 2012–2017, the FDI flows experienced growth in 2018
and 2019 before the pandemic hit, leading to the withdrawal of FDI. Moreover,
this fall in FDI projects and investments is skewed towards economies that are
more integrated into GVCs. With the pandemic severely affecting the production
chains, withdrawal of foreign investment will be more likely to affect such
economies severely. This is supported by the fact that China, the world leader in
fragmented production, witnessed a 13% fall in FDI inflows in the first quarter of
2020. Subsequently, FDI flows to developing Asia declined by US$474 billion
(WIR, 2020).
Europe also experienced a net FDI outflow of US$7 billion in 2020 driven by
repatriation of earnings by foreign firms in response to the pandemic (Dettoni,
2020). International investment agreements (IIAs) have been operating in a new
economic environment. Some countries have made efforts to support them
through online investment facilitation and others have tightened screening to
protect strategic industries. The healthcare industry, in particular, has suffered
measures such as mandatory production and export bans, which have affected the
investment decisions of foreign companies too (Evenett et al., 2020; WIR, 2020)
In addition, the COVID-19 crisis has been unravelling in the context of trade
‘war’ between the two largest economies, the USA and China. The WIR (2020)
reports that ‘at least 11 large cross-border M&A deals were withdrawn or blocked
for regulatory or political reasons’.
The withdrawal of M&As and GFDI deals highlights that the pandemic has an
impact on the extensive margin of FDI investment. In this regard, using a Heckman
selection model on a monthly panel data of 96 economies for the period of January
2019 to June 2020, Fu et al. (2021) highlight the adverse impact of COVID-19
on FDI flows. Specifically, they find that the spread of infection in the host
country significantly affects the decision of FDI projects in the host economy.
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Further, higher mortality in the host economy also leads to a reduction in the value
of FDI announcements. The study also finds that the severity of the virus in the
home country leads to a delay in the completion of ongoing projects. Moreover,
the results from the empirical analysis also showcase higher sensitivity of FDI
flows to the service sector compared to others.
Given the frailty in GVCs highlighted by the pandemic, restructuring of GVCs
and building more resilient GVCs would be the way forward to eventual recovery.
While most economic sectors are affected by the crisis, there are some examples
of growth, for example, ICT, financial services, life science and creative industries,
as COVID-19 accelerates digitisation and brings healthcare in economic focus;
for example, Xiaomi, the Chinese smartphone and electric scooters manufacturer
has expanded its market footprint in overseas markets (FDI Intelligence, 2020).
The Swiss pharma group Roche plans to open new branches in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Tanzania and Angola (FDI Intelligence, 2020). The
Spanish telecommunications company Telefonica and the German insurance
company Allianz in a 50/50 joint venture are planning a 50,000-km broadband
fibre-to-the-home (FTTH) network, worth €5 billion over the next 6 years (FDI
Intelligence, 2020). The growth of more a service-oriented FDI is an outcome of
a shift in global FDI patterns over the past two decades. According to fDI Markets
estimates, in 2003, GFDI projects in manufacturing accounted for 37.8% of global
GFDI projects compared to 12% for business services. Sixteen years later, GFDI
projects in services were 2.3% more than that of manufacturing.
Another pattern of the shift in FDI prior to the pandemic was the investment in
logistics and transportation projects driven by the rise of e-commerce industry
(Doytch, 2021c). In this regard, the GFDI growth in 2018–2019 was driven by the
services and IT industries. Further, lockdown restrictions imposed across the
globe accelerated investment in these types of projects, which will be the basis of
the growth of GFDI in the coming years; for instance, 2020 witnessed an expansion
of Amazon, owing to larger demand through online stores. As a result, Amazon
made investments in the USA, announcing a record 204 US interstate projects
focused on logistics, transportation and distribution projects together valued at
US$21.4 billion (Crawford, 2020). The single investment by Amazon led to jobs
for over 36,000 US workers in the first 3 months of 2020 alone, resulting in a 34%
increase in Amazon’s US workforce. Along similar lines, fDI Markets data
indicate that GFDI worth US$73.5 billion was invested in logistics, distribution
and transportation operations in 2019. These investments also highlight the global
shift towards digitalisation in production and global trade.
In addition to the impact of COVID-19 on FDI, the pandemic has also affected
other aspects of trade and the global economy. To briefly summarise, the first
wave of pandemic led to the imposition of lockdown and social distancing norms
which affected the tourism and travel industry adversely. The lockdown also
resulted in a production shock which later resulted in an amplified demand shock.
In this regard, Vidya and Prabheesh (2020) employ network analysis and show
that the pandemic has resulted in a reduction in trade interconnectedness,
connectivity and density among countries, and that there is an expected change in
the structure of trade networks.
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Moreover, the trade policy response to the pandemic shock also varied across
countries. With massive supply chain disruptions, many economies closed their
borders for the export of essential supplies and removed import restrictions for
critical medical equipment and other essential items required to fight the pandemic.
The decision to close borders for exports of essential items and equipment was in
contrast to the notions resonated by experts and leading economic development
organisations (EDOs), which propagated against the closing of borders for smooth
functioning of the supply chains in order to boost production of essential items
(Baldwin & Evenett, 2020; Bown, 2020a, 2020b; Mattoo & Ruta, 2020; OECD,
2020; WTO, 2020). Evenett et al. (2020) highlight that by May 2020, export
restricting measures in the medical sector peaked against the import facilitation
measures, which experienced a growth till September 2020, documenting the
rapid increase in trade policy activism.
In addition to trade imbalances and policy effects, COVID-19 also adversely
affected various aspects of the economy; for instance, using regression analysis
on five Asian economies, Iyke (2020) documents an increase in economic
uncertainty due to the COVID-19 outbreak. Within this frame of reference, using
wavelet analysis, Choi (2020) highlights that the pandemic-induced policy
uncertainty has affected the sectoral volatility with a magnitude greater than that
witnessed during the global financial crisis.1
It has also been documented that the pandemic resulted in a supply shock
which soon led to a demand shock as well. In this regard, using China Household
Finance survey, Liu et al. (2020) document a significant fall in Chinese household
consumption. Yue et al. (2020) document a change in investment behaviour
towards more risk-averse investments for Chinese households which have a
connection with someone affected by COVID-19 virus. Further, Bauer and Weber
(2020) and Yu et al. (2020) show the negative impact of the pandemic on labour
force participation, and Shen et al. (2020) depict a negative impact on corporate
performance. These studies highlight that COVID-19 pandemic has adversely
impacted various facets of the global economy.

Long-Run Trends of Greenfield Foreign Direct
Investment Worldwide
The fDi Markets data used in this study are transaction-based data. It records and
reports all greenfield investment deals anywhere in the world with their value
of the capital investment, number of employees, location of investment, home
country of investment, industry activity, as well as the identity of the parent and
investing company. The data span from January 2003 to August 2020. We have
made several modifications to the data. First, we have aggregated the values by
quarters and years, in order to analyse the respective trends. Second, we have
applied a conversion algorithm from industry technology codes originally included
in the data to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) Rev. 4
industrial classifications. We present below the analysis of trends of the top 10
host and home countries of GFDI, as well as the top 20 industry recipients of FDI.
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The top 10 recipients of FDI inflows during the period 2003–2020 have been
China, USA, India, UK, Australia, Brazil, Mexico, Vietnam, Russia and Indonesia,
a group that notably contains all the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China)
countries (Figure 1). China is a ‘distant first’ with over US$1.6 trillion in GFDI
received (Figure 1). For comparison, the second country, the USA, has received
less than a trillion in this period (Figure 1). A less discussed aspect of GFDI is the
jobs created through the establishment of the new subsidiaries. In terms of the
jobs created, the top 10 recipient countries of GFDI are China, India, USA, Russia,
Mexico, Vietnam, Romania, Poland, UK and Brazil, whereas in China, there are
over 5 million jobs created by GFDI, versus 3.6 million in India and 2.5 million
in the USA (Figure 2).
At the same time, the top 10 countries as sources of FDI outflows are USA,
UK, Spain, South Korea, The Netherlands, Japan, Germany, France, China and
Canada (Figure 3). Notably, all 10 but China are developed economies. The USA
is a distant number one with over US$2.5 trillion GFDI abroad (Figure 3). Figure
2 also shows a significant increase in outward GFDI in the post-global financial
crisis era (2009–2019), compared to pre-crisis (2003–2008) for all top 10 source
countries. The most significant increase of outward GFDI in the post-crisis period
was experienced by the only developing country in the group, China. The GFDI
outflows from China between the two periods increased approximately five times
(Figure 4).
Analysis of the time series of GFDI inflows and outflows of the top five host
and home countries reveals some interesting trends (Figures 5 and 6). China
displays a downward trend in inflow GFDI and an upward trend in outflow GFDI,

Figure 1. Top 10 Countries with FDI Inflow, 2003–2020.
Source: Authors’ computations, based on data from fDI Markets.

Doytch et al.

Figure 2. Top 10 Countries with Jobs Created Due to FDI, 2003–2020.
Source: Authors’ computations, based on data from fDI Markets.

Figure 3. Top 10 Countries with FDI outflow, 2003–2020.
Source: Authors’ computations, based on data from fDI Markets.

461

462

Foreign Trade Review 56(4)

Figure 4. Top 10 Countries with FDI Outflow, (2003–2019) Pre and Post 2008.
Source: Authors’ computations, based on data from fDI Markets.

Figure 5. Top Five Countries with FDI Inflow, 2003–2020.
Source: Authors’ computations, based on data from fDI Markets.
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Figure 6. Top Five Countries with FDI Outflow, 2003–2020.
Source: Authors’ computations, based on data from fDI Markets.

gradually turning from a net recipient of GFDI to a net source of GFDI in an
ongoing process (Figures 5 and 6), illustrating its move along the investment
development path (Dunning & Narula, 1996). At the same time, USA shows an
upward trend in GFDI inflows and relatively stable levels of outflows, if we
exclude 2020, the year of the pandemic (Figure 6). In both the cases, with the
inflows and the outflows, we observe a sharp decline in FDI during the first three
quarters of 2020. The decline in the inflows is the most substantial for China, a
73% y/y decline (Figure 5). The most significant decline in outflows is for the
USA where the FDI outflows decreased by 54% y/y (Figure 6).
In terms of the industrial classification of the GFDI flows, the top six industries
consist of primary and secondary sector activities: electricity, gas and air conditioning
supply; extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; construction; manufacture of
motor vehicles; manufacture of chemicals; and manufacture of electronic and optical
equipment (Figure 7). Most of these industries have stable levels; the extraction of
crude oil and petroleum and natural gas displays a downtrend over the studied period
(Figure 8). All top five industries show a sharp decline in 2020 (Figure 8).

GFDI During the Financial Crisis and the
COVID-19 Pandemic
The most recent global economic crisis prior to the crisis caused by COVID-19
is the financial crisis of 2008. In this section, we attempt to compare the
behaviour of GFDI during the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 crisis.
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Figure 7. Top 20 Industries (ISIC4-2digit) with FDI Inflow, 2003–2020.
Source: Authors’ computations, based on data from fDI Markets.

Figure 8. Top Five industries (ISIC4-2digit) with FDI Inflow, 2003–2020.
Source: Authors’ computations, based on data from fDI Markets.

The quarterly data of the 5 years leading to the global financial crisis shows a
spike of GFDI inflows in the second and third quarters of 2008 followed by a
moderate decrease in 2009 (Figure 9). For comparison, the 5 years preceding the
COVID-19 crisis display relatively stable levels of GFDI, followed by a
progressive decrease in the first, second and third quarter of 2020, which is the
last quarter we observe in this dataset (Figure 10).

Doytch et al.

Figure 9. Total FDI by Quarter, 2003–2009.
Source: Authors’ computations, based on data from fDI Markets.

Figure 10. Total FDI by Quarter, 2015–2020.
Source: Authors’ computations, based on data from fDI Markets.
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The quarter-to-quarter analysis shows a very different response of GFDI during
the 2008 financial crisis and the ongoing COVID-19 crisis. The financial crisis,
which intensified in the fourth quarter of 2008 had most of its impact on the world
GDP, trade and financial flows in 2009. The GFDI flows collapsed by −166% in
the second quarter of 2009 and then began to recover very slowly (Figure 11).
The overall behaviour of GFDI changed after the 2008 financial crisis. The
crisis put an end to a stable growth trend of the flows in the 2000s. After the 2009
collapse, GFDI had a process of slow recovery, which continued until 2017 when
the global governance situation changed with the election of a new US government
administration that seeked to change the major trade agreements the country
participated in. However, after the initial international economic uncertainty,
provoked by policy changes in the USA, the global GFDI recovered and grew
during 2018, only to slow down again in 2019. The hit of the pandemic started
weighing heavily on the international investment flows in the third quarter of
2020 (Figure 12).
An analysis of the quarterly changes in GFDI in the 5 years preceding the
pandemic shows the lack of long-term growth of global GFDI after 2008. During
the 5 years preceding the pandemic, only 2 years witnessed a growth of GFDI,
2016 and 2018. For most of the post-2008 period, the flows have fluctuated
around a stable worldwide level of US$200 billion without growing. The COVID19 pandemic introduced an additional shock to the already stagnant flows. The
first quarter of 2020 brought worldwide lockdowns of cities and states and increased
uncertainty. The country that went first in and out of lockdown was China. As a
result, the post-covid recovery in China also started before the recovery in Europe

Figure 11. Q-o-Q change in FDI Flow, 2004–2009.
Source: Authors’ computations, based on data from fDI Markets.
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Figure 12. Q-o-Q Change in FDI Flow, 2004–2020.
Source: Authors’ computations, based on data from fDI Markets.

and the USA. The USA and parts of Europe have spent most of 2020 in partial
lockdowns. The main hit of the pandemic on the global GFDI flows occurred in
the third quarter of 2020, a decrease of 152% quarter to quarter. This decrease
occurred in addition to a 51% drop in global GFDI flows in the second quarter and
a 67% decline in the first quarter, which are to be added to a continuous decline
throughout most of 2019 (Figure 13).
The pandemic-caused decline in the global GFDI, however, affected industries
differently. In Figure 14, we explore quarter-over-quarter percentage changes of
GFDI inflows to the top 10 industries of the world. In the left panel, we display
6-year quarter-over-quarter changes of GFDI covering the global financial crisis
period, and in the right panel, we display 6-year time series of quarter-over-quarter
changes of GFDI covering the pre- and post-pandemic period, ending with the
third quarter of 2020.
The top 10 industries include activities from all 3 sectors, that is, primary,
secondary and tertiary, in addition to utilities and construction. The parallel
analysis of the left and the right panels shows that GFDI to the utility industry
(Electricity, gas and air condition supply) was slow to respond to both cases
However, once responded, the decline of the GFDI flows could be significant, up
to 25%. GFDI in the Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas has also
responded with a relatively large contraction in both crises. The quarterly drops
during the financial crisis were of the magnitude of 22% and 25% in the last two
quarters of 2009, and the decline during the pandemic so far has reached 18% in
the third quarter of 2020. This is not surprising considering the global pandemic
lockdowns’ restrictions in travel and the full seizure of air travel. GFDI to the
Construction sector has also responded with sharp declines in both crises.
The following three industries are from the manufacturing sector. GFDI to
manufacturing of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers has been relatively
sensitive to and relatively quick to respond to both crises with drops of the

468

Foreign Trade Review 56(4)

magnitude of 11% in the first two quarters of 2009 during the financial crisis and
17% in the second quarter of 2020. Again, this is a sector that is tightly linked to
the ability to travel, and as such, it is expected to be highly affected by the
pandemic-induced economic crisis. The other two manufacturing sectors have not

Figure 13. Q-o-Q Change in FDI Flow, 2015–2020.
Source: Authors’ computations, based on data from fDI Markets.

(Figure 14 continued)
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(Figure 14 continued)

Figure 14. Quarter-Over-Quarter Change in FDI Flows, in Billions USD.
Source: Authors’ computations, based on data from fDI Markets.

responded in the same fashion. GFDI to manufacturing of chemicals and chemical
products responded with a significant decline (22%) and a quick recovery during
the financial crisis, but not in the pandemic crisis. GFDI to manufacturing of
computer, electronic and optical equipment has barely decreased in both cases.
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The tenth top industry is the manufacturing of basic metals. GFDI into this
industry was more responsive to the financial crisis rather than the current
pandemic crisis.
In the top 10 industries, we have two services industries as well: accommodation
and financial service activities. GFDI to the accommodation sector, which is a
key part of tourism, declined by 11%–12% quarter-over-quarter in both crises.
Although the tourism sector suffered an initial contraction at the beginning of the
pandemic, many hotels re-positioned themselves as potential accommodation for
lockdown periods and long-term stay for people working remotely. As a result, the
sector started a partial recovery and the GFDI deals have not been completely
interrupted. The GFDI in the financial industry has also had a minor contraction
in both crises. Contrary to the expectation that a financial crisis would bring
investment in banking and insurance to a standstill, this has not been the case for
GFDI. After a decline by 5% in the second quarter of 2009, it went on a gradual
recovery. The reason why the decline was not more severe was the fact GFDI is a
brand new investment, not a purchase of existing banking assets whose value may
have significantly declined during the crisis. Interestingly, GFDI in finance did
not contract significantly in the current financial crisis either. This has been one of
the industries, which continued to function in a remote mode.
If we zoom into industry-level dynamics of GFDI during the COVID-19
lockdowns of 2020 (Table 1), we see that the most affected industries were

Table 1. Industry-level GFDI During the First Three Quarters of 2020.
ISIC 4, 2Digit Code
6
7
19
20
22
23
24
26
27
28
29

Description

Q1

Q2

Q3

Extraction of crude petroleum
and natural gas
Mining of metal ores
Manufacture of coke and
refined petroleum products
Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
Manufacture of rubber and
plastics products
Manufacture of other nonmetallic mineral products
Manufacture of basic metals
Manufacture of computer,
electronic and optical products
Manufacture of electrical
equipment
Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
Manufacture of motor vehicles,
trailers and semi-trailers

2,008

6,954

619

770
300

396
1,800

486
1,500

10,184

13,561

6,561

2,817

1,441

576

2,587

583

186

2,708
3,374

834
13,737

837
2,169

6,951

2,231

904

3,433

892

575

6,627

1,855

2,662
(Table 1 continued)
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(Table 1 continued)
ISIC 4, 2Digit Code
35
41
47
49
55
58
61
64
68

Description
Electricity, gas, steam and air
conditioning supply
Construction of buildings
Retail trade, except of motor
vehicles and motorcycles
Land transport and transport
via pipelines
Accommodation
Publishing activities
Telecommunications
Financial service activities,
except insurance and pension
funding
Real estate activities

Q1

Q2

Q3

29,273

36,453

10,343

10,301
2,690

9,107
1,714

4,177
3,130

4,335

3,344

2,551

6,804
7,081
1,973
5,062

1,838
3,042
6,301
1,797

1,690
2,186
1,909
658

444

191

267

Source:   Authors’ computations, based on data from fDI Markets.
Note: n.e.c: not elsewhere classified.

manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products, with a decline of 77%
between Q1 and Q2 of 2020; manufacture of machinery and equipment with a
decline of 74%, accommodation, with a decline of 73%; manufacture of motor
vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, with a decline of 72%; financial service
activities with a decline of 64% between Q1 and Q2 of 2020.
The industries affected the worst in the third quarter of 2020 were extraction of
crude petroleum and natural gas, with a 91% q-o-q decline; manufacture of
computer, electronic and optical products, with a decline of 84% q-o-q; retail
trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles, with a decline of 83%;
manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products, with a decline of 68%, and
financial service activities, with a q-o-q decline of 63%. The above numbers show
that by the second quarter of 2020, there was already a substantial slowdown of
the international value chains, but by the third quarter, some industries’ GFDI was
in collapse. Most notably, the extractives and some of the main manufacturing
industries’ GFDI were very hard hit by the pandemic crisis.

Conclusion
In this article, we attempt to evaluate the behaviour of GFDI during the beginning of the pandemic, that is, the first three quarters of 2020. We do not attempt to estimate the magnitude of the effect with an empirical model, but
rather evaluate the fluctuations in GFDI and make a comparison to the 2008
global financial crisis, which also affected the entire world adversely. We attempt to cast light on which countries’ and industries’ GFDI is most affected
by the pandemic. To our surprise, many of the services industries GFDI flows
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have shown a certain resilience and flexibility to a switch to a remote work
mode, while the manufacturing industries’ and the extractive and utility industries’ GFDI, which are parts of GVCs, have contracted more significantly.
The COVID-19 pandemic has brought to the forefront vulnerabilities of GVCs
and globalised trade. The heavy dependence of the world on GVCs has resulted in
these shocks resonating to other countries, adversely affecting global trade and
future investments. In this regard, evidence from UNCTAD reports a substantial
withdrawal of foreign investment overall, with rapid disinvestment from China
and other supply chain-oriented economies (UNTAD, 2020). However, despite
the susceptibility of GVCs to global shocks, the way forward remains that of
restructuring and building resilient GVCs. Fostering resilient GVCs brings to the
foreground the importance of EDOs. With the rapid reduction in global foreign
investment in developing countries, these organisations should direct their
attention and resources to existing investors and make efforts at retaining their
investments. Through such actions, they can provide avenues for host countries to
strengthen their relationship with investors and local businesses. In this regard,
the UNCTAD WIR 2020 report states that, with the reduction in GFDI, EDOs
should use their services to support and foster joint ventures and other partnership
modes, which would help countries recover from the pandemic shock faster along
with aiding investment prospects at the time of global turmoil.
Every crisis presents an opportunity for improvement. The COVID-19
pandemic has brought about an urgency in building resilient supply chains. In a
survey of 60 supply chain executives conducted by Mckinsy (McKinsey Global
Institute, 2020), 93% reported their aim in making their supply chains more
resilient. In this regard, one way forward would be to diversify supplier networks
that safeguard a firm from national and regional shocks. This strategy, if adopted,
would result in an inflow of FDI to diverse regions, thereby helping those
economies which have been seeking to overtake China as the next hub of
manufacturing. Another step towards building resilience in GVCs would be a
greater sharing of knowledge between firms aimed at standardising the product,
which could enable a swift shift of production during times of shocks. Another
key aspect is improving logistics capability which, as documented earlier, was
already on the rise, and the pandemic has accelerating investment in this segment.
Hence, policies along these lines could help rejuvenate the falling foreign
investment and direct them to more diverse regions and sectors.
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Note
1. In the context of financial and exchange markets, Ali et al. (2020) empirically document
a global market free fall for nine countries due to the pandemic. Gil-Alana and CaludioQuiroga (2020) highlight a transitionary effect on the Japanese stock market and a permanent effect on China. Narayan (2020) also find similar results for the Japanese stock
market. Al-Awadi et al. (2020) also find a negative effect on stock market returns for
China. On a related front, Haroon and Rizvi (2020) report that the panic generated
by the pandemic leads to the generation of volatility. Phan and Narayan (2020) also
show that the market overreacts to unexpected information and corrects itself in the due
course as more and more information is made available.

References
Ali, M., Alam, N., Rizvi, S. A. R. (2020). Coronavirus (COVID-19)—An epidemic or
pandemic for financial markets. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance,
100341. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2020.100341
Araujo, J. D., David, A. C., van Hombeeck, C., & Papageorgiou, C. (2017). Joining the
club? Procyclicality of private capital inflows in lower income developing economies.
Journal of International Money and Finance, 70, 157–182.
Bauer, A., & Weber, E. (2020). COVID-19: How much unemployment was caused by the
shutdown in Germany? Applied Economics Letters, 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13
504851.2020.1789544
Baldwin, R., & Evenett, S. (Eds). 2020. COVID-19 and trade policy: Why turning inward
won’t work. VoxEU.org eBook, CEPR Press. https://voxeu.org/content/covid-19-andtrade-policy-why-turning-inward-won-t-work
Bown, C. (2020a, March 13). Trump’s trade policy is hampering the US fight against
COVID-19. https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/trumpstrade-policy-hampering-us-fight-against-covid-19
Bown, C. (2020b, March 24). EU limits on medical gear exports put poor countries and
Europeans at risk. https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/
eu-limits-medical-gear-exports-put-poor-countries-and
Broner, F., Didier, T., Erce, A., & Schmukler, S. L. (2013). Gross capital flows: Dynamics
and crises. Journal of Monetary Economics, 60(1), 113–133.
Canh, N. P., & Thanh, S. D. (2020). The Dynamics of export diversification, economic
complexity and economic growth cycles: Global evidence. Foreign Trade Review.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0015732520970441
Choi, S. Y. (2020). Industry volatility and economic uncertainty due to the COVID-19
pandemic: Evidence from wavelet coherence analysis. Finance Research Letters,
101783. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2020.101783
Crawford, J. (2020). Pandemic pushes Amazon to expand US logistics footprint. FDI
Intelligence.
Dettoni, J. (2020). Covid-19 triggers capital flight from Europe. FDI Intelligence.
Doytch, N. (2015). Sectoral FDI cycles in South and East Asia. Journal of Asian Economics,
36(1), 24–33.
Doytch, N. (2020). Upgrading destruction? How do climate-related and geophysical natural
disasters impact sectoral FDI? International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and
Management, 12(2), 182–200.
Doytch, N. (2021a). Do FDI inflows to Eastern Europe and Central Asia respond to the
business cycle? A sector level analysis. The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, 23,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeca.2020.e00194

474

Foreign Trade Review 56(4)

Doytch, N. (2021b). FDI—Hot or cold? The behavior of sectoral FDI inflows and outflows
over periods of growth accelerations and decelerations (Unpublished Manuscript).
Doytch, N. (2021c). Who gains from services FDI --Host or home economies? An analysis
of disaggregated services FDI inflows and outflows of 24 European economies.
Foreign Trade Review. https://doi.org/00157325211010230
Dunning, J. H., & Narula, R. (1996). The investment path revisited: Some emerging issues.
In J. H. Dunning, & R. Narula (Eds.), Foreign direct investment and governments:
Catalysts for economic restructuring (pp. 1–41). Routledge.
Evenett, S., Fiorini, M., Fritz, J., Hoekman, B., Lukaszuk, P., Rocha, N., Ruta, M., Santi,
F., & Shingal, A. (2020). Trade policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis:
Evidence from a New Data Set (Policy Research Working Paper No. 9498). World
Bank. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34942
FDI Intelligence. (2020). Global Investment still in the woods. https://www.fdiintelligence.
com/article/79161
Fu, Y., Alleyne, A., & Mu, Y. (2021). Does lockdown bring shutdown? Impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic on foreign direct investment. Emerging Markets Finance and
Trade, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2020.1865150
Gil-Alana, L. A., Claudio-Quiroga, G. (2020). The COVID-19 impact on the Asian stock
markets. Asian Economics Letters, 1(2), 17656. http://dx.doi.org/10.46557/001c.17656
Haroon, O., Rizvi, S. A. R. (2020). COVID-19: Media coverage and financial markets
behavior—A sectoral inquiry. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance,
100343. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2020.100343
Iyke, B. N. (2020). Economic policy uncertainty in times of COVID-19 pandemic. Asian
Economics Letters, 1(2), 17665. http://dx.doi.org/10.46557/001c.17665
Lane, P. R. (2015). International financial flows in low-income countries. Pacific Economic
Review, 20(1), 49–72.
Liu, T., Pan, B., & Yin, Z. (2020). Pandemic, mobile payment, and household consumption:
Micro-evidence from China. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 56(10), 2378–
2389. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2020.1788539
McKinsey Global Institute. (2020). Risk resilience and rebalancing in global value chains.
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/Operations/
Our%20Insights/Risk%20resilience%20and%20rebalancing%20in%20global%20
value%20chains/Risk-resilience-and-rebalancing-in-global-value-chains-fullreport-vH.pdf
Mattoo, A., & Ruta, M. (2020, March 13). Don’t close borders against coronavirus. Financial
Times. https://www.ft.com/content/b571fc08-f985-4322-9a88-3bd0fbb52e5a
Narayan, P. K. (2020). Has COVID-19 changed exchange rate resistance to shocks. Asian
Economics Letters, 1(1), 17389. http://dx.doi.org/10.46557/001c.17389
OECD. (2020). COVID-19 and international trade: Issues and action. OECD. https://
read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=128_128542-3ijg8kfswh&title=COVID-19-andinternational-trade-issues-and-actions
Phan, D. H. B., & Narayan, P. K. (2020). Country responses and the reaction of the stock
market to COVID-19—A preliminary exposition. Emerging Markets Finance and
Trade, 56(10), 2138–2150. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2020.1784719
Shen, H., Fu, M., Pan, H., Yu, Z., & Chen, Y. (2020). The impact of the COVID-19
pandemic on firm performance. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 56(10), 2213–
2230.
UNCTAD. (2020). Investment trend monitor report 2020. https://unctad.org/system/files/
information-document/diae_gitm34_coronavirus_8march2020.pdf

Doytch et al.

475

Vidya, C. T., & Prabheesh, K. P. (2020). Implications of COVID-19 pandemic on the global
trade networks. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 56(10), 2408–2421.
WIR. (2020). World investment report 2020: International production beyond the
pandemic. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva.
WTO. (2020, April). Trade in medical goods in the context of tackling COVID-19. https://
www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/rese_03apr20_e.pdf
Yu, Z., Xiao, Y., & Li, Y. (2020). The response of the labor force participation rate to an
epidemic: Evidence from a cross-country analysis. Emerging Markets Finance and
Trade, 56(10), 2390–2407. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2020.1787149
Yue, P., Gizem Korkmaz, A., & Zhou, H. (2020). Household financial decision making
amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 56(10),
2363–2377. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2020.1784717

